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Abstract
We introduce a framework within evolutionary game
theory for studying the distinction between objective
and subjective rationality and apply it to the evolution
of cooperation on 3-regular random graphs. In our sim-
ulations, agents evolve misrepresentations of objective
reality that help them cooperate and maintain higher
social welfare in the Prisoner’s dilemma. These agents
act rationally on their subjective representations of the
world, but irrationally from the perspective of an exter-
nal observer. We model misrepresentations as subjec-
tive perceptions of payoffs and quasi-magical thinking as
an inferential bias, finding that the former is more con-
ducive to cooperation. This highlights the importance
of internal representations, not just observed behavior,
in evolutionary thought. Our results provide support for
the interface theory of perception and suggest that the
individual’s interface can serve not only the individual’s
aims, but also society as a whole, offering insight into
social phenomena such as religion.
Keywords: evolution; rationality; cooperation; quasi-
magical thinking; perception
Introduction
Economic theory has traditionally assumed it impossi-
ble, or at least unreasonably difficult, to directly ob-
serve preferences and beliefs, preferring to assess agents
by their behavior. A similar tradition exists in evolu-
tionary biology and ecology, where internal factors are
seen as secondary to the behavior that determines fitness
and thus evolutionary outcomes. Given these roots, it is
unsurprising that evolutionary game theory (EGT) has
adopted a similar attitude, embracing a behavior-centric
approach to describing model agents. While this has
made a great deal of theoretical work tractable, it has
also made human deviations from rationality difficult to
model. Our primary goal is to overcome this limitation
by introducing into EGT a framework for studying dif-
ferences between objective and subjective experiences.
Of central importance to classical economic theory is
the simplifying assumption of rationality. In traditional
theory, this rationality is taken literally and is assumed
to apply at the objective level of explicit payoffs and be-
havior. However, if we are to model humans, we should
be conscious of the fact that decisions act on internal
representations of rewards and beliefs about the conse-
quences of past and future actions. There is no a priori
reason to believe that these internal representations are
perfectly aligned with external payoffs. In fact, the ex-
perimental field of neuroeconomics reveals that there are
often marked differences between the objective and sub-
jective rewards that participants experience (Lee, 2008).
Decisions made on the basis of these internal representa-
tions can thus appear irrational to an external observer,
who is na¨ıve about the agent’s mental state and only
aware of the external rewards. However, from the agent’s
perspective, these actions could be rational, given the
agent’s internal representation. This is the concept of
subjective rationality. It is reasonable to explore the
possibility that many of these subjective representations
are shaped by evolution.
To illustrate this concept, we look at cooperation—the
typical proving ground for EGT. Because cooperation in-
volves paying a cost so that another individual can derive
a benefit, cooperators risk being exploited. Often, as in
the Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, the objectively ratio-
nal strategy is to defect rather than cooperate, because
defection exploits cooperators and prevents exploitation
at the hands of other defectors. Nevertheless, humans
playing PD often cooperate, even when experimenters
are careful to exclude factors that encourage coopera-
tion (Sally, 1995; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Research
suggests that this is caused by a propensity to consider
extraneous subjective factors, such as uncertainty (Shafir
& Tversky, 1992; Croson, 1999), irrelevant goals (Bagassi
& Macchi, 2006; Sun, Li, & Li, 2008), aversion to
inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & Camerer,
2007), discounting of future rewards (Erev & Roth,
1998; Lee, Conroy, McGreevy, & Barraclough, 2004),
counterfactual reasoning (Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer,
& Montague, 2007; Camerer, 2011), in-group favo-
ratism (Kaznatcheev, 2010; Hartshorn, Kaznatcheev, &
Shultz, 2013), and judgments of reputation (Nowak &
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Sigmund, 1998), trustworthiness (McNamara, Stephens,
Dall, & Houston, 2009) and other moral characteris-
tics (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005). We argue that,
while such behavior is objectively irrational, it could nev-
ertheless be rational from a subjective point of view. Hu-
man participants may be maximizing their payoffs; it’s
just that the game they are perceiving may not be the
one that the experimenter intended. By directly mod-
eling the agent’s subjective state, learning and decision
making process, we are embracing McNamara’s (2013)
suggestion that researchers should consider enriching
EGT models with features such as psychological mecha-
nisms, decision making, personality variations and novel
traits, with the aim of accounting for the extensive vari-
ation in empirical studies across both people and cul-
tures (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich et al., 2004).
Quasi-magical thinking
An interesting category of subjective effects is what
Shafir and Tversky (1992) termed quasi-magical think-
ing (QMT). Whereas magical thinking refers to the mis-
taken belief that an action affects an outcome that it
cannot, QMT describes situations where behavior is con-
sistent with this belief without it being explicitly held.
Several counterintuitive findings in behavioral game the-
ory fall under this heading. For instance, humans co-
operate more readily when a partner’s choice is un-
known (Shafir & Tversky, 1992)—a puzzling response
pattern consistent with the erroneous view that cooper-
ation will encourage reciprocity, even in one-shot games.
Similarly, participants make more optimistic predictions
about their partner’s chances of cooperation if they
themselves have already decided to cooperate (Dawes,
McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977), as if their decision can in-
fluence their partner.
Though QMT seemingly violates rationality,
Masel (2007) argues that it could result from a
reasonable inferential bias. When judging a partner’s
probability to cooperate, assuming that that partner is
similar to oneself can yield a rapid, accurate prediction
if information is scarce. A player might therefore benefit
from observing not just what a partner does, but also
what they would have done in the partner’s position. If
the player is indeed similar to the population at large,
then this bias could yield valuable data. Masel (2007)
showed that, if used during periods of uncertainty, this
type of QMT could also lead to greater cooperation in
a public-goods game.
In the next section, we present a novel EGT framework
for representing and acting on subjective conceptions
of reality. We use this framework to demonstrate that
agents playing PD on a random 3-regular graph, when
allowed to evolve subjective representations of the game,
converge on an objectively incorrect representation of
the interaction. This misrepresentation of the objective
game’s payoffs leads our subjectively rational agents to
Figure 1: U-V plane partitioned into 12 regions accord-
ing to rank ordering of the payoffs; notable games are
named. Shading corresponds to the density of agents’
evolved subjective payoffs, with the blue agents from
runs with objective reality of (U, V ) = (−0.3, 1.3) and
red from (U, V ) = (−0.9, 1.9). A total of 10000 agents
from 20 independent runs are plotted at the 2000th time
step. The inset shows the proportion of cooperation ver-
sus evolutionary cycle, where each line is a run.
cooperate—an objectively irrational choice. We further
show that an inferential bias (QMT) also promotes coop-
eration, though to a lesser extent than misperceiving the
payoffs does. This is our contribution to the mounting
evidence that rationality and irrationality should not be
dichotomized and that internal representations are im-
portant to evolutionary dynamics. While humans cer-
tainly behave irrationally in PD from an objective per-
spective, in that they do not optimize the stated payoffs,
they might be using a perceptual interface where subjec-
tive payoffs reflect extraneous concerns in addition to in-
dividual fitness effects. They might also be using QMT
as a reasonable inferential bias. Humans, in other words,
may be acting rationally on their subjective rather than
objective payoffs or using subjective knowledge in unan-
ticipated ways.
Model and Method
Game space
In our model, an agent (Alice) engages in a game with
an adjacent individual (Bob). The players independently
choose between two pure strategies: to cooperate (C) or
defect (D). By subtracting from all payoffs any constant
offset and choosing our units, the payoff for Alice is given
by the canonical matrix
(
1 U
V 0
)
where Alice’s choice
determines the row (first row for C, second for D) and
Bob’s the column (first column for C, second for D). We
can plot this parameterization of all two-player symmet-
ric games in the U-V plane, as shown in Figure 1. The
different possible rank orderings of the 4 payoffs divide
the plane into 12 qualitatively distinct regions. Some
of the well-known games are marked with their names;
game 1, for instance, is Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and has
V > 1 > 0 > U . The typical representation of the PD
game, in terms of a cooperator providing a benefit (b)
to her partner at a cost (c) to herself, with b > c > 0,
translates to (U, V ) = (− cb−c , bb−c ) in the canonical rep-
resentation. A not-so-competitive (i.e., friendly) envi-
ronment has cb−c near 0, and a competitive envrionment
has cb−c ≥ 1/2. The exact value of the right hand side
depends on factors like the spatial structure and can be
calculated from Ohtsuki-Nowak transform (Ohtsuki &
Nowak, 2006); 1/2 corresponding to the 3-regular ran-
dom graph condition that we study.
If V < 1 (games 5–12), then cooperation is ratio-
nal (and an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)), and
if U < 0 (games 1,5,9 and 10) then defection is rational
(and ESS); otherwise both pure strategies are irrational
without more information about the partner. For games
5 (Assurance), 9 and 10 (i.e., when both U < 0 and
V < 1), cooperation and defection are both rational,
with the rational behavior depending on further infor-
mation about the partner.
Subjective representations
For each run of the simulation, we fix a specific game
(U, V ) as objective reality. This game’s payoffs deter-
mine agents’ fitness and thus drive evolution. However,
for the agent’s decision process (cooperation vs. defec-
tion), we do not allow explicit access to these objective
payoffs. Instead, each agent has an evolved internal rep-
resentation of the game—their individual perception of
the payoffs. For instance, Alice might think the game
is (UA, VA) and Bob might think it is (UB , VB). Sup-
pose Alice cooperates and Bob defects. Their fitness is
adjusted according to the real game, so Alice’s fitness
changes by U and Bob’s by V . However, Alice believes
that the effect on her fitness is UA and Bob thinks the
effect on his is VB .
These internal conceptions of the game can be mis-
perceptions, emotional biases like inequality aversion, or
other ingrained beliefs about the underlying interaction.
The representation of the game passes from parent to
offspring under the influence of natural selection. Suc-
cessful agents pass on their conception of the game (given
by a value −2 < U < 2 and −1 < V < 3), subject to
a small mutation rate: With probability 0.05 (mutation
rate), the generational transmission is faulty and the off-
spring is born with a game selected uniformly at random
from ±0.1 (mutation size) the parent’s U and V values.
The qualitative results are robust to changes in muta-
tion, as long as the rate is not unreasonably high.
Learning and quasi-magical thinking
The last ingredient for decision making is estimating the
probability that a partner will defect or cooperate. Alice
has a mind that consists of her estimate pˆA of the proba-
bility p that her partner cooperates when she cooperates,
and qˆA of the probability q that her partner cooperates
when she defects. Since (UA, VA) do not change during
Alice’s lifetime, we count it as genetically determined
and shaping the mind, but not a direct part of it. No
agent can condition their action on the action of their
partner, p = q, but we avoid hard-coding this knowledge
into Alice and allow pˆA to differ from qˆA.
The agent is thus fully specified by 4 parameters:
her perceived game (UA, VA) and her probability esti-
mates pˆA and qˆA. She acts rationally on this informa-
tion, deciding to cooperate only if the expected subjec-
tive utility of doing so is greater than that of defection,
pˆA + (1− pˆA)UA > qˆAVA.
To ensure that Alice has a chance to sample both
strategies, we incorporate a small trembling-hand pa-
rameter (Selten, 1975): With probability  = 0.1, Alice
takes the action opposite of the one she intends.
Alice’s estimates of pˆA and qˆA are based on Bayesian
inference from an initially uniform distribution, resulting
in rational learning, or calculation of the maximum likeli-
hood estimate (also the best Bayesian estimate given the
squared error loss function; Griffiths & Yuille, 2006):
pˆA =
nCC + 1
nCC + nCD + 2
, qˆA =
nDC + 1
nDC + nDD + 2
(1)
For QMT agents, we adopt a strategy similar to Masel
(2007) and modify the mechanism for belief updating. If
Alice is a QMT agent, then she not only observes what
Bob does, but also simulates what she would have done
in his place and then uses both pieces of information in
her Bayesian learning. This results in:
pˆA =
2nCC + nCD + 1
2(nCC + nCD) + 2
, qˆA =
nDC + 1
2(nDC + nDD) + 2
(2)
In both sets of equations, nij is the number of times
Alice acted i and her partner acted j. The agents are
simple Bayesian learners that update their minds after
each interaction. A newborn agent has nCC = nCD =
nDC = nDD = 0 and thus pˆ = qˆ = 1/2.
Structured interactions
Agents and the strategies they implement do not work
in a vacuum: An agent’s payoff is a function of both its
strategy and the context in which that strategy is exe-
cuted. The spatial (or interaction) structure of the world
is thus central to the question of cooperation and altru-
ism in EGT (Albert & Baraba´si, 2002; Szabo´ & Fa´th,
2007). In fact, without any interaction structure (an
inviscid environment), no matter what reasonable repre-
sentation of the agents’ behavior we choose, cooperation
will not emerge in PD.
We consider a minimal spatial structure and gener-
ate random 3-regular graphs on 500 nodes. Using the
analytic theory of Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006) for ana-
lyzing these graphs, we expect to find cooperation when
the inverse of the competitiveness is between 0 and 1/2.
When cb−c =
1
2 , we expect a rapid phase transition from
universal cooperation to universal defection.
Agents inhabit the nodes of the graph (one agent per
node) and interact with adjacent agents. The simulation
begins from a random distribution of agents over the
graph and over genetic space (−2 < U < 2, −1 < V < 3
and whether the agent uses regular Bayesian inference or
QMT). Each evolutionary cycle alternates between gen-
erating fitness from interactions and reproducing. Dur-
ing the interaction step, Alice decides her action inde-
pendently for each neighbor, updating her mind (pˆA and
qˆA) after each interaction. At each reproductive step,
10% of agents are randomly selected for death. This
death rate acts as a seperation of the interaction and
evolution time-scales; with 10% and 3-regular graphs,
an average agents has about 30 interactions during its
life, but the results are largely unchanged for reasonable
(not too high) death rates. Neighbors of the perished
agents compete to repopulate the vacated cells with their
offspring (known as death-birth updating; Ohtsuki &
Nowak, 2006). The probability of Alice winning this
competition is proportional to the objective payoff she
accumulates from the current round of interactions with
all her neighbors.
Results
Our primary results are presented in Figure 1. The main
figure is a density plot of agents by their genetic internal
representation of the game. Darker regions correspond
to more agents with those (U, V ) values. A total of 5000
agents of each color are plotted, recorded from the last
evolutionary cycle of 10 independent simulations. The
objective game is PD, with (U, V ) = (−0.3, 1.3) in blue,
and (U, V ) = (−0.9, 1.9) in red.
For the highly competitive world indexed by red data
points, where the benefit of cooperation is only 19/9
times the cost, most agents evolve toward an objectively
correct conception of the game: The internal represen-
tation of most of the agents corresponds to PD, with a
minority evolving toward Hawk-Dove and Leader games.
On the other hand, in the relatively friendly environment
indexed by blue data points, where the benefit of coop-
eration is only 13/3 times the cost, most agents evolve
toward misrepresentations of objective reality that are
conducive to cooperation. In particular, most agents in
the blue condition evolve internal representations where
Figure 2: Proportion of cooperative interactions versus
c
b−c . Blue shows the evolution of subjective payoffs;
red, evolution of standard Bayesian and QMT agents;
green, co-evolution of both; and black, completely ratio-
nal Bayesian agents that do not evolve. Line thickness
represents standard error from averaging 10 runs.
the only rational action is cooperation: Games 6-8 and
11-12. No agents in the friendly environment evolve the
objectively correct PD representation.
The benefit of misrepresenting reality is highlighted in
the inset of Figure 1, which shows the proportion of coop-
eration versus evolutionary cycle. Blue lines correspond
to the proportion of cooperation in 10 independent runs
with (U, V ) = (−0.3, 1.3) and the red lines correspond to
10 runs with (U, V ) = (−0.9, 1.9). Although the actions
of agents in the friendly environment are objectively irra-
tional, they are subjectively rational and—through their
subjective misrepresentation of reality—produce much
higher levels of cooperation and greater social welfare
than do the agents in the highly competitive environ-
ment.
Introducing QMT highlights the relative importance
of perception vs. inference. As can be seen in Figure 2,
the co-evolution of perception (subjective payoffs) and
inference (standard vs. QMT) results in the green curve
that best approximates the expected transition from all
cooperation to all defection (offset of 0.1 from total sat-
uration due to shaky hand in both cases) at cb−c =
1
2 .
However, subjective payoffs and QMT evolving on their
own relax the transition in different directions. In par-
ticular, if perception is fixed to objective truth and infer-
ence is allowed to evolve then we get significationly lower
levels of cooperation in the low competition regime (red
line). On the other hand, if perception evolves but in-
ference is fixed at rational (no possibility for QMT) then
cooperation is sustained in more competitive regimes
than expected. The social welfare from misperception
is greather than that of QMT, although both lead to
significant cooperation in friendly environments.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate several key points concerning
the relationship between behavior and internal represen-
tations. To start, it is not necessarily the case that agents
evolve a true representation of the game they are play-
ing. This agrees with findings in behavioral game theory
suggesting that humans often deviate from objectively
rational behavior by incorporating seemingly extrane-
ous factors into their decision-making process (Fehr &
Camerer, 2007; Sun et al., 2008; Lee, 2008). Use of such
information is analogous to misinterpreting the game’s
payoff matrix—something that our simulated agents do
when the world is less competitive.
However, we also observe that misrepresentation is not
universal. In highly competitive environments, agents
evolve an approximately correct representation of objec-
tive reality and do not succumb to QMT. This suggests
an empirical test of our theory: Do humans misrepresent
reality more in friendly social settings or competitive
ones? Our study suggests that mental representations
are more accurate in the latter case.
Furthermore, we show that misrepresenting reality is
not necessarily detrimental to individual or group per-
formance. In the friendly environment, agents’ mis-
representations allow cooperation to flourish, despite
each agent being solely interested in maximizing its own
payoff. This allows the population to overcome coop-
eration’s risk of exploitation because the cooperators
become insensitive to the possibility of defectors tak-
ing advantage of them. Inevitably, mutual cooperation
emerges and, in the friendly environment, is sufficient to
sustain erroneous perception of payoffs.
Realist vs. interface theories of perception
The most direct consequence of our results is for un-
derstanding the veridicity of perception. The orthodox
view (Yuille & Bulthoff, 1996; Palmer, 1999) is critical
realism—perception resembles reality, although it does
not capture all of it. The typical evolutionary justifica-
tion for this is that veridicity has greater utility for an
agent and will be selected for by natural selection. Our
results show that this is not always the case.
Hoffman (1998, 2009) provides an alternative, by hy-
pothesizing that perception is an interface that hides un-
necessary complexity irrelevant to the agents’ aims. In
the case of evolution, the “aim” is maximizing fitness,
and thus perception does not need to be truthful, but
has to provide an interface through which the agent can
act to maximize its fitness. Mark et al. (2010) confirmed
this with an evolutionary model showing that fitness is
more important than “truth” to the agent. If percep-
tion is expensive, then the agent will tune it to reflect
the fitness distribution—something that depends on the
interaction between agent and objective reality.
Our results extend beyond this to show that some-
times tuning reflects not just the individual agent’s, but
the population’s interaction with the world. Our agents
evolve misrepresentations of objective reality that pro-
vide them with incorrect fitness information to promote
a social good. This happens despite the fact that the
agents act rationally on their perceptions. Further, un-
like Mark et al. (2010), we don’t have to include a penalty
for more accurate representations. In fact, our agents
are capable of overcoming an implicit penalty associated
with misrepresentation. In the less competitive environ-
ments where cooperation emerges, if Alice were to sud-
denly switch to accurate perception of payoffs then—in
the short term—she could exploit her neighbors to get
a strictly higher fitness. In short, our results not only
strengthen the case for the interface theory of perception,
but also suggest regarding the individual’s interface as
not just serving the aims of that individual, but those of
society as a whole.
An interesting domain for such social interfaces is re-
ligion. Religion is often lauded for promoting cooper-
ation and moral behavior (Brooks, 2003; Regnerus &
Burdette, 2006) and often criticized for disseminating
incorrect and even delusional beliefs (Dawkins, 2006;
Hitchens, 2007). When evaluating the net impact of re-
ligion, these two well-supported positions are typically
placed in opposition. Our model is consistent with both
of these claims, while providing an explanation of how
these tendencies can emerge from the same underlying
process. Unlike previous work (Roes & Raymond, 2003;
Johnson & Bering, 2006), our model does not rely on
group-selection or punishment, so it applies to both mor-
alizing and non-moralizing gods, reaching more cultures.
To sum up, by creating agents who lack an a priori
understanding of the world, we demonstrate that such
agents can evolve a misrepresentation of reality. Fur-
thermore, because evolution selects for adaptive behav-
ior rather than accurate internal representations, these
delusions may prove useful by encouraging a greater de-
gree of cooperation than rationality would otherwise al-
low. By offering an example of how internal representa-
tions and their consequences for behavior can be studied
in a game theoretic context, we hope to pave a path for
understanding how and why humans deviate from objec-
tive measures of rationality. Though often ignored, the
key may be subjective experiences.
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